Loosening the Grips of the Contract Claws: How a More Balanced Approach Can Help States Address Their Budget Shortfalls by Aaron Barham
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 
Volume 26 
Issue 2 Volume 26, Winter 2012, Issue 2 Article 5 
January 2012 
Loosening the Grips of the Contract Claws: How a More Balanced 
Approach Can Help States Address Their Budget Shortfalls 
Aaron Barham 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred 
Recommended Citation 
Aaron Barham (2012) "Loosening the Grips of the Contract Claws: How a More Balanced Approach Can 
Help States Address Their Budget Shortfalls," Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development: Vol. 26 : 
Iss. 2 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred/vol26/iss2/5 
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by 
an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
LOOSENING THE GRIPS OF THE CONTRACT
CLAWS: HOW A MORE BALANCED APPROACH




In recent years, as states have struggled to find solutions for the budget
shortfalls and revenue shortages brought about by the Great Recession, the
compensation of public employees has become a contentious subject. A
number of politicians have reasoned that public employee compensation
has contributed to the current fiscal crisis and have encouraged legislators
to cut public employee pay and benefits, modify collective bargaining
agreements, privatize certain public services, and even eliminate collective
bargaining rights altogether. Several examples of recent condemnation
have raised important questions about the appropriate level of state and
local government compensation.
"We have a new privileged class in America. We used to think of
government workers as underpaid public servants. Now they are better
paid than the people who pay their salaries ... . Who serves whom
here? Is the public sector - as some of us have always thought -
there to serve the rest of society? Or is it the other way around?" 2
-Governor Mitch Daniels, Indiana
There are "two classes of people in New Jersey[:] Public employees
who receive rich benefits, and those who pay for them." 3
-Governor Chris Christie, New Jersey
I J.D., St. John's University School of Law, 2012; B.A., University of Virginia, 2007
2 Pat Garofalo, Gov. Daniels Bashes Public Employees As 'A New Privileged Class,'
THINKPROGRESS, June 7, 2010, http://wonkroom.thinkprogress.org/2010/06/07/daniels-public-pay/.
3 Chris Christie, Gov., N.J., Address at the New Jersey Conference of Mayors' Annual Luncheon
(Apr. 29, 2010), http://njcm.org/Conference20 10.
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"Look, I understand that teachers are the brains of the operation,
O.K.? But my hours are cut, and my taxes are killing me. They have
got to take it in the ear, too." 4
-Michael Tini, Card Dealer, Atlantic City, New Jersey
Regardless of the degree to which public employees are to blame for
states' dire fiscal circumstances, the frustration of Gov. Daniels and Gov.
Christie is understandable. Indiana and New Jersey, like the vast majority
of other states in the country, are currently in a financial crisis amidst the
most serious and sustained economic downturn since the Great Depression.
The economic slowdown has caused the steepest decline in tax receipts on
record.5 While tax revenues have decreased, the need for critical state-
funded services has not. As a result, even after making very deep spending
cuts over the last two years, at least forty-six states struggled to close
shortfalls when adopting budgets for fiscal year 2011.6
For states that face large budget gaps, the consequences are severe.
Budget difficulties have led over forty-six states to reduce services to their
residents, including some of their most vulnerable families and
individuals.7 Thirty-one states, including New York, have restricted
eligibility to health insurance programs or access to health care services. 8
Even more states have implemented cuts to K-12 education 9 and public
4 See Michael Powell, Public Workers Face Outrage as Budget Crises Grow, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2,
2011, at Al.
5 See Elizabeth McNichol, Phil Oliff, & Nicholas Johnson, States Continue to Feel Recession's
Impact, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, Jan. 9, 2012,
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfn?fa=view&id=7 11; see also Mikel Chavers, A Tale of 4 States:
Insights from Vermont, North Carolina, North Dakota and Montana into Dealing with Recession,
CAPITOL IDEAS, http://www.csg.org/pubs/capitolideas/JanFeb_2011/ATaleof4States.aspx (State tax
revenues were 8.4 percent lower in fiscal year 2009 than in 2008, and an additional 3.1 percent lower in
2010).
6 Nikolas J. Ortner, Low Cost Freedom: Optimizing the Success of Early Prisoner Release
Initiatives, THE INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT, Nov. 2010, available at
http://www.soa.org/library/newsletters/the-independent-consultant/201 1/february/ind-201 1 -iss33-
ortner.aspx; see McNichol, supra note 5.
7 McNichol, supra note 5. In order to stimulate revenue, New York's budget reflected significant
increases in the cigarette tax and the imposition of a tax on sugary drinks. It also increased State income
taxes by over $4 billion annually. Joan Gralla, Governor Paterson Seeks $136 Billion Budget, Non-diet
Soda Tax, REUTERS, Jan. 19, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/19/us-newyork-budget-
idUSTRE60146W20100119.
8 Nicholas Johnson, Phil Oliff & Erica Williams, An Update on State Budget Cuts: At Least 46
States Have Imposed Cuts That Hurt Vulnerable Residents and the Economy, CENTER ON BUDGET AND
POLICY PRIORITIES, Feb. 9, 2011, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfin?fa=view&id=1214 (New York's
cuts to Medicaid and CHIP included reduced or frozen reimbursements to health care providers); Jeff
Sell, Autism Society Public Policy Report, AUTISM SOCIETY, Mar. 9, 2011,
http://support.autismsociety.org/site/Clubs?club id=1217&sid=16434&pg-news.
9 Johnson, supra note 8; K-12 EDUCATION AND OTHER CHILDHOOD EDUCATION PROGRAMS,
GLOBAL COLLEGE SEARCH ASSOCIATES, LLC [hereinafter GLOBAL COLLEGE SEARCH ASSOCIATES],
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colleges and universities, while increasing the price of college tuition due
to insufficient state funding.1o Finally, states have made reductions in a
variety of other programs, including those for poor families and other
vulnerable populations. 1 Such spending cuts are additionally problematic
during a recession because they reduce overall demand and can make the
downturn deeper.12
In New York State, one group that has not experienced the effects of
these budget cuts is the State's unionized workforce,13 which is one of the
largest categories of expenditures for government operations.14 Out of an
operating budget of $79.2 billion, New York State spends nearly $1 1
billion on wages for its work force of 220,000.15 Moreover, the cost of
providing medical insurance for these workers is expected to surge from
$1.8 billion to $2.5 billion over the next three years. 16 By 2015, state
pension costs, which are set by law in Albany, will exceed $8 billion a
year, compared with $2.6 billion last year, according to a state projection.17
Governor Paterson's Executive Budget Proposal for fiscal year 2011
attempted to address the projected $8.5 billion shortfall by providing for
savings of $250 million from money spent on its state workforce by
renegotiating some of the terms of its collective bargaining agreements.18
http://www.globalcollegesearch.org/index.php/get-educated/be-an-advocate-for-education/ (last visited
Apr. 11, 2012).
10 Johnson, supra note 8; Global College Search Associates, supra note 9. In its FY2011 budget
New York cut funding for public universities by 10 percent relative to the previous academic year, cut
aid to community colleges by 11 percent and cut grants awarded by a financial aid program that serves
students from low and moderate income families. The state's university system previously increased
resident undergraduate tuition by 14 percent beginning with the spring 2009 semester.
11 New York, for example, has implemented cuts to localities, leading to local concerns about
reductions in funding for policing, child care assistance, meals for the elderly, hospice care, services for
veterans and seniors, and other services. See Johnson, supra note 8.
12 Id. The companies and organizations that would have received such govemment payments have
less money to spend on salaries and supplies, and individuals who would have derived benefits now
have less money for consumption. This reduces demand from the economy. Id.
13 With respect to the non-unionized work force, however, the governor withheld all
management/confidential pay raises for 2009-10, longevity bonuses and merit awards, and the 4
percent annual increase in 2010-11, for a total savings of $86.6 million. See Donna Snyder, Pay Raises
Rescinded for About 70, BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 13, 2011,
http://www.buffalonews.com/city/communities/southem-tier/article591958.ece.
14 When the State enters into a collective bargaining agreement with its unionized workforce,
certain terms and conditions of the agreements are enacted into law. The most recent agreements were
negotiated in 2007, and were predicated upon optimistic forecasts regarding the State's and nation's
fiscal health. See Editorial, State Workers andN. Y's Fiscal Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2011, at WK9.
15 See Michael Barbaro, Cuomo on a Collision Course With Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, at
Pl0; see also Editorial, supra note 14.
16 See Barbaro, supra note 15; see also Steven Greenhouse, States Aim Ax at Health Cost of
Retirement, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2011, at Al.
17 See Barbaro, supra note 15. In addition, New York State has promised more than $200 billion
worth of health benefits to its retirees, but has set aside almost nothing to pay for them. Id
18 See Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction at
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Governor Paterson attempted to achieve those savings by negotiating with
the collective bargaining representatives of public employees. These efforts
were unsuccessful, and the representatives declined to agree to any
reductions in expenditures for current State employees.19
A. How New York State's Collective Bargaining Agreements Work
New York State is party to collective bargaining agreements with a
number of public employee organizations 20 pursuant to Article 14 of the
New York Civil Service Law, also known as the Taylor Law. "[T]o
promote harmonious and cooperative relationships between government
and its employees and to protect the public by assuring, at all times, the
orderly and uninterrupted operations and functions of government," the
Taylor Law describes the rights of employee organizations as well as the
rules that govern their employment relationship with the State..21 In
addition, the Taylor Law grants state employees the right to be represented
by unions,22 prohibits strikes by public employees, 23 requires public
employers to negotiate and enter into agreements with public employee
organizations regarding terms and conditions of employment, 24 establishes
impasse procedures for the resolution of CBA disputes, 25 and establishes a
state agency to administer the law-the Public Employment Relations
Board (PERB).26
11-12, Donohue v. Paterson, No. 1:10-CV-00544 (N.D.N.Y. May 19, 2010) [hereinafter Defendants'
Memorandum of Law] The specific process for achieving such savings was to allow unions
representing the State workforce to negotiate personnel savings on the basis of mutual agreement so that
the State could close its revenue shortfall. Predictably, no such agreement occurred. id.; see also Press
Release, Division of the Budget, State of New York, Governor Paterson's 2010-11 Executive Budget
Proposes Significant Spending Reductions, Key Long-Term Reforms To Eliminate $7.4 Billion Budget
Cap (Jan. 19 2010), available at
http://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/press/201 0/pressReleasel _eBudgetO1.html.
19 See Defendants' Memorandum of Law, supra note 18, at 7; see also Division of the Budget,
supra note 18.
20 These public employee unions include the Civil Service Employees Association, the Public
Employees Federation, the N.Y.S. Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent Association, among
others. See GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, NEW YORK STATE, STATE-UNION
CONTRACTS (2012), http://www.goer.state.ny.us/LaborRelations/Contracts/index.cfm; see also OFFICE
OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, WHO WE ARE, http://www.ocb-nyc.org/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2012).
21 N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 200 (Consol. 2011).
22 N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 203 (Consol. 2011).
23 N.Y. CIV. SERv. LAW § 210 (Consol. 2011).
24 N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 204-a (Consol. 2011).
25 N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§ 209,214 (Consol. 2011).
26 N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 213 (Consol. 2011). The PERB was established as an independent
agency, statutorily separated from the Civil Service Department. To perform the functions mandated by
the Taylor Law, it is organized with three program units, each responsible for administering the
collective negotiations dispute resolution processes, resolving representation and improper practice
matters, and representing the PERB in court actions. See PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS BOARD, NEW
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An examination of a number of provisions in the State's contract with
the Public Employees Federation, a union that represents attorneys,
accountants, social workers, and nurses, reveals that the State has vested a
number of rights to its employees. These provisions include a four percent
wage increase,27 salary schedule and job rate parity, overtime work and
pay, paid leave, the right to be laid off only on the basis of seniority, and a
thirty-day minimum notice requirement before altering the worker's
workweek or workday. 28 Terms also restrict the State's ability to modify or
impair these contracts by giving State employees the right to be free from
unilateral attempts to modify the CBA, prohibiting abridging the duration
of the CBA, and providing the right to be free from furlough type layoffs.29
Moreover, the Triborough Amendment to the Taylor Law prohibits public
employers from altering any provision of an expired labor agreement until
a new labor agreement is reached. 30 This amendment requires automatic
pay increases where a salary step schedule or longevity schedule exists,
even if the labor agreement has expired. 31
The New York State Legislature finally passed the budget for fiscal year
2011 on August 2, 2010, 125 days after it was due. 32 The budget did not
provide for any reductions to the salary or benefits of New York's
unionized workers, partially because of the contractual provisions codified
by the Taylor Law and the Triborough Amendments. 33 Instead, the budget
raised taxes by nearly $4 billion, cut school aid by over $1.5 billion, and
raised another $1 billion through uniform, across-the-board cuts to
programs such as Medicare. 34
YORK STATE, OVERVIEW (2012), http://perb.ny.gov/Overview.asp.
27 See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of the Application for Preliminary Injunction at
7, Donohue v. Paterson, No. 1:10-CV-00544 (N.D.N.Y. May 18, 2010) [hereinafter Plaintiffs'
Memorandum of Law]; see also Adam Sichko, State Workers Receive 4% Pay Raises Today, Adding
$400M to NY Payroll, THE BUS. REv., Apr. 1, 2010, available at
www.bizjoumals.com/Albany/stories/2010/03/29/daily38.html.
28 See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law, supra note 27, at 11; see also Michael R. Bloomberg,
Limit Pay, Not Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2011, at A23.
29 See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law, supra note 27, at 10-12; see also Bloomberg, supra note
28.
30 See N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 209-a(l)(e) (Consol. 2011).
31 See id.
32 See Danny Hakim, 125 Days Late, a State Budget with New Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2010, at
Al; see also NY State Lawmakers Finalize $136 Billion FY 2011 Budget, REUTERS, Aug. 4, 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/04/us-budget-newyork-idUSTRE67342F20100804.
33 See Hakim, supra note 32; see generally THOMAS P. DINAPOLI, N.Y.S. COMPTROLLER, REPORT
ON THE STATE FISCAL YEAR 2011-12 EXECUTIVE BUDGET (2011).
34 See Hakim, supra note 32; see also Defendants' Memorandum of Law, supra note 18, at 11.
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B. New York State's Budget Crisis and Donohue v. Paterson
Six months before the passage of the August 2, 2010 legislation, the
State had no budget in place. This necessitated the "appropriat[ion of]
funds to authorize essential expenditures such as payroll, unemployment
insurance, pharmaceutical coverage, and veterans' benefits." 35 Determined
to achieve the $250 million in savings that Governor Paterson was unable
to negotiate with the public employees' unions, the State Legislature passed
an emergency appropriations bill that enacted unpaid furloughs, a wage
freeze, and a benefits freeze on its unionized state employees. 36 These
appropriation bills, also known as "extender bills," temporarily funded the
operation of the State in the absence of an official budget. These extender
bills suspended payment of a four percent wage increase, 37 suspended
reimbursement paid to employees for professional development and
training programs, 38 and imposed a one-day unpaid furlough, forcing the
majority of State employees to take an unpaid day off during the week of
May 1 0th
C. Contract Clause Analysis
By way of the Contract Clause, which provides that "[n]o state shall . . .
pass any . .. Law impairing the [o]bligation of [c]ontracts," 39 various civil
service organizations moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the State
from submitting, enacting, and implementing these "extender bills." While
the language of the Contract Clause appears absolute on its face, its reach is
limited by the State's sovereign power to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens. 40 The extent to which the Clause limits State power
is determined by a three-part test articulated by the Supreme Court in
United States Trust v. New Jersey, which questions "(1) whether the
contractual impairment is, in fact, substantial; if so, (2) whether the law
serves a significant public purpose, such as remedying a general social or
economic problem; and, if such public purpose is demonstrated, (3)
35 See Defendants' Memorandum of Law, supra note 18, at 12.
36 See id. at 5..The majority of furloughs were to last for only one day, and the wage freeze applied
only to management and confidential level employees. The benefits freeze was intended to be
temporary.
37 See id at 4; see also Fighting for Our Future, 29.5 PUBLIC EMPLOYEE ADVOCATE: THE
NATIONAL PUBLICATION OF AFT PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 1, 3 (2010).
38 Defendants' Memorandum of Law, supra note 18.
39 U.S. CONsT. art. 1, §10.
40 See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978); see also Hudson Cty.
Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1908).
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whether the means chosen to accomplish this purpose are reasonable and
necessary." 41
Applying the test set forth in U.S. Trust, the district court in Donohue v.
Paterson granted the public employees unions' preliminary injunction and
held that that the proposed unpaid furloughs, wage freezes, and benefit
freezes violated the Contract Clause. First, the court found that these
measures constituted a substantial contractual impairment, reasoning that in
an employment contract, the promise to pay a certain sum of money is the
"most important element [] of a contract," and "the central provision upon
which it can be said [the employees] reasonably rely." 42 Thus, despite the
State's contention that the withholding of salary increases was temporary
and therefore not substantial, the court found that the plaintiffs satisfied the
first prong of the Contracts Clause inquiry. 43 Addressing the second prong
of the test, the court found that the emergency appropriations bill served the
significant public purpose of addressing the State's fiscal crisis. 44 While the
court noted that the public purpose inquiry was not "immediately resolved
by reference to the State's budgetary problems," 45 the court found that the
State's pressing need to meet its obligations constituted a legitimate
government interest.46
Even if a state establishes that its legislation addresses a legitimate
public purpose, to withstand challenge under the Contract Clause,
legislation that substantially impairs contractual rights must employ means
that are "reasonable and necessary" to meet the stated legitimate public
purpose of the legislation.47 Because the State of New York was a party to
the contracts underlying the Plaintiffs' challenge, the court subjected the
State to "less deference scrutiny."48 To be reasonable and necessary under
this type of scrutiny, it must be shown that the State "did not (1) 'consider
impairing ... the contracts on par with other policy alternatives' or (2)
'impose a drastic impairment when an evident and more moderate course
41 Sanitation and Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of N.Y., 107 F.3d 985, 993 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing
U. S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1977)).
42 See Donohue v. Paterson, 715 F. Supp. 2d 306, 318-19 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Buffalo
Teachers Fed'n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 368 (2d Cir. 2006)).
43 See Donohue, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 319.
44 See id. at 320-21.
45 Id at 320.
46 See id. at 321.
47 See U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977); see also Ass'n of Surrogates &
Supreme Court Reporters v. New York, 940 F.2d 766, 774 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The contract clause, if it is
to mean anything, must prohibit New York from dishonoring its existing contractual obligations when
other policy alternatives are available.").
48 See Donohue, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 321-22.
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would serve its purpose equally well,' nor (3) act unreasonably 'in light of
the surrounding circumstances."' 49 The extender bills, in the court's view,
did "not present a close case," because the State could not direct the court
to legislative consideration of more moderate policy alternatives, even
though neither the plaintiffs nor the court could identify an alternative
means for the State to address its budget gap.50
Finally, because the weekly extender bills were not "budgetary
legislation in the normal course," the court found that the State acted
unreasonably. 51 Here, the bills did not permit deliberation beyond approval
or rejection in its entirety, because a failure to enact the bill for the
subsequent week was in effect a vote for government shutdown. 52 As a
result, the judge issued a preliminary injunction to enjoin the State from
enacting the extender bills, finding that the State could not show the
requisite level of consideration and tailoring to prove that the provisions of
the bill were reasonable and necessary. 53
The conclusion that Governor Paterson's proposed extender bill was not
"reasonable and necessary" is an understandable application of U.S. Trust.
Under U.S. Trust, when a state attempts to modify a contract that it is a
party to, it is virtually impossible for a state's contractual impairment to be
found reasonable and necessary under "less deference scrutiny." This is
because a court need only hypothesize an alternative means of achieving
all, or merely some, of the State's objectives, even if those means severely
impair the rights of taxpayers. This analysis imposes severe substantive
restraints on a state's ability to free itself from a contractual provision that
may be inconsistent with the broader interests of its citizens. Considering
the massive budget shortfalls that states face in recessions and the harsh
consequences that can result from alternative budget balancing measures,
this Comment argues that modification of Contract Clause jurisprudence is
necessary for states to exercise their critical police power.
This Comment begins in Part I by reviewing modern Contracts Clause
jurisprudence and examining how courts have applied it to public contracts.
Part II then contrasts this approach with the more deferential standard
advocated by the Framers and the first two hundred years of Supreme
Court jurisprudence. In Part III, this Comment explains the confusion
49 Id. (quoting Buffalo Teachers Fed'n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 371 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing United
States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 30-31)).
50 See Donohue, 715 F. Supp.2d at 323.
51 Id. at 323.
52 See id
53 See id. at 325.
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created by the "reasonable and necessary" doctrine and argues why a more
deferential approach is required. Part IV of this Comment proposes a
solution that will bridge the gap between the deferential framework of the
first two centuries of the Contract Clause and the modem test arising out of
U.S. Trust. This solution strikes an appropriate balance between the social
costs associated with the deprivation of public contracts and the negative
consequences that result from a state being forced to enact harsh measures
to close its budget gaps. Finally, Part V of this Comment addresses
arguments against applying a more deferential Contracts Clause standard to
public contracts.
I. THE MODERN APPLICATION OF THE CONTRACTS CLAUSE TO PUBLIC
CONTRACTS
A. Blaisdell and Asbury Park: Laying a Foundation for the Exercise of a
State's Police Power
The seminal case in modem Contracts Clause jurisprudence, Home
Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell stands for the proposition that
states can modify contracts when they are acting within the scope of their
emergency police powers. 54 In this case, after the onset of the Great
Depression, the Minnesota legislature passed a law that postponed the
foreclosure of mortgages and extended periods of redemption. 55 Home
lenders challenged the statute as an impairment of their contract under the
Contract Clause. However, the Blaisdell Court concluded that the statute
was an appropriate extension of the State's police power to protect the vital
interests of the community.56 While an emergency does not create state
power, the Court reasoned that an emergency "may furnish the occasion for
the exercise of power." 57 Such an exercise of power, the Court noted, must
be balanced with the importance of protecting contracts against
impairment, which is inherently vital to the peace and stability of society.58
Given that the legislation in Blaisdell addressed an economic emergency
and the period of redemption was to be extended only temporarily, the
Supreme Court concluded that the Minnesota statute did not violate the
54 See Home Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434 (1934).
55 See id. at 415. The Act, which declared that an emergency existed, was to remain in effect only
during the continuance of the emergency and for no longer than two years. Id.
56 See id at 434.
57 Id. at 426. The Court in Blaisdell concluded, therefore, that the reservation of the central
attributes of sovereign power are read into contracts. See id at 435.
58 See id. at 443-44.
2012] 287
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Contracts Clause. 59 Thus, Blaisdell established that some flexibility would
be allowed in Contracts Clause jurisprudence, laying the foundation for
future decisions, which allowed states to modify contracts to protect the
welfare of its citizens. 60 This standard was reinforced by the Supreme
Court thirty years later in Faitoute Iron and Steel Co. v. Asbury Park,
where the Court stated that a state's powers are more expansive when the
contracting parties are corporations created for "public purposes, by
legislative acts, and where the subject matter of the contract is one which
affects the safety and welfare of the public." 61
B. Applying the Contract Clause to the Impairment of Contracts to Which a
State Is a Party
In recent years, courts have implemented a more restrictive view of the
Contract Clause, giving less deference to legislators when a state is a party
to the contract. In United States Trust Company v. New Jersey, the
Supreme Court considered a challenge to a New Jersey statute that limited
the ability of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to subsidize
rail passenger transportation from revenues and reserves. 62 In this case, the
Court stated that "a State is not completely free to consider impairing the
obligations of its own contracts on a par with other policy alternatives" 63
and noted that a state "cannot refuse to meet its legitimate financial
obligations" simply because it would rather spend the money on the public
good rather than on the welfare of its creditors.64 Any substantial
impairment of a contract, the Court stated, must be "reasonable and
59 See id. at 447.
60 See Ronald D. Wenkart, Unilateral Modification of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Times
of Fiscal Crisis and Bankruptcy: An Unconstitutional Impairment of Contract?, 225 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 3
(2007); see also Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 699 F. Supp. 1204, 1212 (D.R.I. 1987).
61 Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 515 n.2 (1942) (quoting Chicago B. &
Q. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U.S. 57, 72 (1898)). Faitoute involved the New Jersey Municipal Finance
Act, which provided that a bankrupt local govemment could be placed in receivership by a state agency.
Id at 503. A plan for the composition of creditors' claims was required to be approved by the agency,
the municipality, and 85 percent in amount of the creditors. Id at 504. The plan would be binding on
nonconsenting creditors after a state court conducted a hearing and found that the municipality could
not otherwise pay off its creditors and that the plan was in the best interest of all creditors. Id at 504
n.1.
62 See U. S. Trust Co v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 1 (1977). The Port Authority was established by a
compact between New York and New Jersey to coordinate the transportation infrastructure, including
the bridges, seaports, tunnels, and airports, within the Port of New York and New Jersey. Id. at 4. While
the compact was between the two states and was approved by Congress, the Port Authority was
conceived as a financially independent entity with funds primarily derived from private investors. Id.
63 Id. at 30-31.
6 Id. at 29.
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necessary" to address the state's important purposes. 65
Because New Jersey sought to impair contracts to which it was a party,
the Court introduced a test called "less deference scrutiny" to determine
whether New Jersey's contractual impairment was "reasonable and
necessary." For legislation to be found reasonable and necessary under this
standard, the state must show that it did not (1) consider impairing the
contract(s) on par with other policy alternatives, (2) impose a drastic
impairment when an evident and more moderate course would serve its
purpose equally well, or (3) act unreasonably in light of the surrounding
circumstances.66 The Court found that New Jersey's impairment was not
"necessary" for two reasons. First, it reasoned that a less drastic
modification could have permitted the contemplated plan without removing
the covenant's limitations on the use of Port Authority revenues and
reserves to subsidize commuter railroads.67 Second, the court reasoned that
New Jersey could have adopted alternative means of achieving its goals by
implementing taxes on gasoline or parking. 68
C. New York State Cases Applying the Contract Clause to Collective
Bargaining Agreements
In In re Subway-Surface Supervior's Association v. New York City
Transit Authority, the New York Court of Appeals upheld a state statute
barring the payment of a five percent wage increase for New York City
Transit Authority workers due to a financial emergency. 69 At that time,
New York City was undergoing an historic fiscal crisis after years of
incurring substantial deficits. 70 The court held that the statute was
constitutional even though the wage increases were mandated pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement. 71 Employing a broader and more flexible
view of the Contracts Clause than the Supreme Court in U.S. Trust, the
Court of Appeals stated that the State may validly exercise its police power
to serve an important public purpose if it does so in a manner that is not
65 Id.
66 See id. at 30-31.
67 See U S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 29-30.
68 See id at 30.
69 See Subway-Surface Supervisors Ass'n v. N. Y. City Transit Auth., 375 N.E.2d 384, 386 (N.Y.
1978).
70 See id. at 387.
71 See id. Under the collective bargaining agreement entered into by the parties, the New York
City Transit Authority employees were to be given a five percent general wage increase. Id. The
suspensions of the salary increases were to continue for one year or until the Emergency Financial
Control Board met its financial plan. Id.
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"arbitrary or oppressive." 72 The court considered the wage freeze to be a
"limited intrusion" because it "neither terminat[ed] ... existing
employment nor depriv[ed] ... payment for services that had been
rendered in the past."73 Thus, the court found the statute to be a "necessary
and reasonable address to a concededly important public purpose." 74
In a more recent application of the U.S. Trust test to public contracts, the
Second Circuit in Buffalo Teachers Federation v. Tobe upheld a New York
State statute that froze teachers' wages. 75 In the spring of 2004, the Buffalo
Fiscal Authority faced a $50 million budget gap and estimated that its
budget gap for the next four years would exceed $250 million.76 This led
the Fiscal Authority to implement a wage freeze that prohibited the
unionized city employees from receiving a two percent wage increase. 77
The Second Circuit applied the U.S. Trust three-pronged test to examine
whether the contractual impairment was substantial, whether it addressed a
legitimate public purpose, and if so, whether the means that served this
purpose were reasonable and necessary. 78 First, the court found the two
percent wage freeze to be a substantial impairment.79 The court also
determined that the New York Legislature had a legitimate public purpose
in implementing the wage freeze because the City of Buffalo faced a severe
fiscal crisis.80 Thus, the relevant inquiry was whether the wage freeze was
"reasonable and necessary."
Here, the court applied "less deference scrutiny"81 because the State was
a party to the contract. The court noted that the review board did not treat
the wage freezes on par with other policy alternatives because the wage
freezes were only intended to be a last resort measure. 82 Addressing the
second prong of this inquiry, the Second Circuit noted that the Authority
imposed the wage freeze only after other measures had been tried or
72 Id. at 388.
73 See id at 390.
74 Id. at 391.
75 Buffalo Teachers Fed'n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 370 (2d Cir. 2006) The State Legislature
established the Buffalo Fiscal Stability Authority to oversee the City of Buffalo's finances. Id. The
Buffalo Fiscal Stability Authority Act stated that the city was in a state of fiscal crisis and that the
welfare of its residents was being threatened. Id. The purpose of this Act was to achieve fiscal stability
for Buffalo and its schools by 2007-2008. Id.
76 Id. at 366.
77 Id. at 367.
78 Id at 368.
79 See id.
80 See id.
81 See Buffalo Teachers, 464 F.3d at 371.
82 See id.
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considered.83 Finally, the Second Circuit noted that this wage freeze was
temporary and did not affect past salary due for work already performed.
Thus, the court found that the impairment was not "drastic."
In analyzing whether an evident and more moderate course would have
served the City's purpose equally well, the court rejected the union's
argument that taxes could have been raised or other services could have
been burdened or eliminated; stating that "[i]t cannot be the case . . . that a
legislature's only response to a fiscal emergency is to raise taxes." 84 The
court found "no need to second-guess the wisdom of picking the wage
freeze over other policy alternatives," 85 preferring the City's methods of
closing its budget gap over the "Draconian" remedies of further layoffs, or
the elimination of essential services. 86
II. THE HISTORICAL APPLICATION OF THE CONTRACT CLAUSE TO PUBLIC
CONTRACTS
A. Did the Founders Intend for the Contract Clause to Apply to Public
Agreements?
While modem courts have understood the Contract Clause to require
"less deference scrutiny" when a state attempts to modify a contract to
which it is a party, many scholars have argued that the Constitution's
Framers perceived the Contract Clause to be applicable only to private
agreements. 87 Indeed, the ability for representatives to respond to the needs
of their constituents is one of the "fundamental premises of our popular
democracy." 88 For a political system that relies on elections to hold
politicians accountable and to "clean out the rascals," the effectiveness of
this system is compromised when these same "rascals" can perpetuate their
policies indefinitely by simply creating binding contracts. 89
In line with this idea, the Framers of the Constitution understood the
83 See id (noting that the city had already laid-off employees and closed schools; that the City of
Buffalo had cut 800 teaching and 250 teaching assistant positions in the four years preceding the wage
freeze; and that it was only after these more drastic measures that the Buffalo Fiscal Authority found the
salary freeze essential).
84 Id. at 372 (explaining that because the Fiscal Authority had already raised taxes, the court
believed that any additional increase in taxes would have worsened the City's financial situation).
85 See id.
86 See id
87 See, e.g., BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 15-16 (1938); see
also Thomas Merrill, Public Contracts, Private Contracts, and the Transformation of the Constitutional
Order, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 597, 599 (1986).
88 U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 45 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89 Id
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Contract Clause to be used as a safeguard for economic transactions
entered into by private parties, rather than as a protection for obligations of
which the State is a party. 90 A review of the history of the Constitutional
Convention reveals that the Contract Clause was not intended to apply to
anything other than purely private contracts. 91 Many founders stated that
the Clause referred "merely to contracts between individuals." 92 Indeed,
only two anti-federalists supported a reading of the Clause that
encompassed public contracts. However, their "interpretations were denied
by members of the Convention, and the denials were not challenged." 93
B. Contract Clause Jurisprudence Before U.S. Trust
While Contract Clause cases decided before the Supreme Court's U.S.
Trust decision involved corporate charters rather than public undertakings,
these decisions established the principle that Contract Clause challenges
were to be resolved by "according unusual deference to the lawmaking
authority of state and local govemments." 94 The Supreme Court's holding
in the case of Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Goldsboro is
emblematic of this deference to states' sovereign authority. 95 In this case,
North Carolina contracted with a railway company to operate rail lines in
the State.96 Pursuant to the charter, the railroad acquired in fee land for use
as rights-of-way and similar transportation activities.97 While the Court
recognized that the charter was a binding contract, the Court upheld a State
ordinance that circumscribed the railroad's activities on its own land,
holding that the Contract Clause does not have the effect of overriding the
State's power to "establish all regulations that are reasonably necessary to
secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the
90 See JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, Vol. IV, 334 (2d
ed. 1836); see also WRIGHT, supra note 87, at 15.
91 See US. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 45 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also WRIGHT, supra note 87, at
15.
92 ELLIOT, supra note 90, at 191.
93 WRIGHT, supra note 87, at 16.
94 US. Trust, 431 U.S. at 46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95 See id. at 49; see, e.g., Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 670 (1878). In this case, the
Illinois General Assembly granted a corporate charter to a fertilizer company to run for fifty years. Id. at
663. The corporation thereafter invested in a factory on land it owned within the area designated by the
charter. Id. at 664. Five years later, the village authorities of Hyde Park passed an ordinance that
prohibited the transportation within the village and forbade the operation of the factory, essentially
rendering the company's charter valueless. Id. at 665. The Supreme Court, nevertheless, rejected the
contention that the new ordinance offended the Contract Clause. Id. at 670.





In early 2 0 th century cases such as Blaisdell, Faitoute, and Goldsboro, as
long as a state's actions were not "unreasonable and arbitrary" 99 the
Supreme Court deferred to the regulatory power of states. However, the
Court in U.S. Trust characterized this historical view of the Contract Clause
as "provid[ing] no protection at all."oo It reasoned that deference to a
legislature's assessment of necessity would be inappropriate because the
legislature would virtually always prefer to reduce its financial obligations
and spend that extra money on what it regards as a more important public
purpose.101 The Court reconciled its requirement that legislation be
"reasonable and necessary" to meet its stated public purpose with prior
precedent by distinguishing between the exercise of state power that is
"purely financial" 102 and the exercise of state power in the areas of health,
environmental protection, and transportation.103 The Court then reasoned
that when a state has a financial obligation, it acts on the level of an
ordinary person entering into a contract rather than in its capacity as
sovereign entity. 104
While one cannot disregard the importance of states fulfilling the
contracts into which they enter, the Supreme Court had previously
determined the distinction between financial motives and health and safety
concerns as illusory. 05 As a practical matter, the Court recognized in
Blaisdell that a state's interest in financial decisions is just as legitimate as
its interest in regulating health and transportation. 106 As an analytical
matter, the Contract Clause prohibits a state from making policy decisions
"motivated by a simple desire to escape its financial obligations 107" just as
it prevents a state from recklessly pursuing policies involving health and
safety. 08 Thus, rather than automatically according less deference to states
that infringe upon the rights of its public employees, the proper inquiry
98 Id. at 558; see Faitoute Iron and Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 508 (1942).
99 New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. New Orleans, 281 U.S. 682, 685 (1930) In applying this standard,
Justice Butler explained that a state would have wide discretion in determining what precautions taken
in the public interest were actually appropriate under the circumstances. Id.
100 US. Trust, 431 U.S. at 26.
101 See id. at 29.
102 See id. at 25.
103 See id. at 21.
104 See id at 24.
105 See id. at 43 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Home Bldg. and Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398, 435-36 (1934).
106 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 435.
107 US. Trust, 431 U.S. at 52 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108 See id. at 42.
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should more closely follow previous Contracts Clause jurisprudence by
asking whether, in times of fiscal emergencies, the state's choice of policy
is not "retroactive, reckless or excessive."
III. PROBLEMS WITH A "REASONABLE AND NECESSARY" STANDARD OF
REVIEW
Many problems have arisen from the U.S. Trust Court's three-pronged
"less deference scrutiny" test. Namely, the inquiry makes it nearly
impossible for states to respond to economic crises by modifying
burdensome contracts. In the case of Donohue v. Paterson, the State of
New York, unable to address its $8.5 billion budget shortfall by modifying
the contracts of its unionized workers, was forced to raise taxes by nearly
$4 billion, reduce Medicare services by $1 billion, and reduce education
costs by another $1.5 billion. Such measures hardly resemble the "evident
and more moderate course" required by the third prong of the U.S. Trust
test. 109
The "reasonable and necessary" standard has also been difficult for
judges to apply. This is in part because the words "reasonable" and
"necessary" have long had very different meanings. Reasonableness has
long been considered the most relaxed form of judicial inquiry, 10 while
necessity has been known as the strictest form of review.111 The result is an
odd hybrid combining the two extremes of judicial analysis. 112 Courts have
faced confusion wielding this test, as evidenced by decisions that have
applied very different levels of deference to cases with similar factual
circumstances. In Carlstrom v. Washington, for example, the State
declared an economic emergency and enacted legislation that deferred a
five percent salary increase for teachers at community colleges. 113 The
Washington Supreme Court invalidated this legislation, reasoning that "the
State was fully aware of its financial problems . . . prior to signing the
Agreement."11 4 However, in Subway-Surface Supervisor's Association v.
109 See id. at 31.
110 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) ("If the classification has some
'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution . . . ."); see also Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
Ill See Shapiro v. Thompson 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (stating that a classification which burdens
a fundamental constitutional right must be "necessary to promote a compelling government interest");
see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
112 See Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972); see also U. S. Trust., 431 U.S. at 31.
113 Carlstrom v. Washington, 694 P.2d 1, 3 (Wash. 1985).
114 Id. at 5.
294
THE CONTRACT CLAWS
New York City Transit Authority, the New York Court of Appeals took a
more flexible view of the Contracts Clause and held that the withholding of
a five percent general wage increase was a valid exercise of the State's
police power.115 In recent New York cases, the Second Circuit in Buffalo
Teachers found "no need to second-guess the wisdom" of the City of
Buffalo's proposed wage freeze over harsh alternatives, 116 while the
Donohue court held the State of New York to an exacting standard by
invalidating its extender bills.117
Part of this confusion can be attributed to the new meanings given to the
word "necessary" by the majority in U.S. Trust. Rather than inquiring
whether "the government can achieve the purposes of the regulation
equally effectively by one or more narrower regulations,""18 the courts in
U.S. Trust and in Donohue found that a state's impairment of a contract
was not "necessary" simply by hypothesizing alternatives that were more
burdensome to taxpayers. The phrase "equally effective," a component of
the third prong of the U.S. Trust test, should be applied literally. A
regulation should not be invalidated because of an alternative that is
"nearly as effective." 1l9 Moreover, a regulation that is less restrictive for
one group of people, but more restrictive for others, should not be
considered a more moderate alternative.120
The new meaning of "reasonableness"'21 also leads to confusion. Courts
no longer defer to the "'reasonable judgments' of the duly authorized
decision-makers." 22 Instead, they ask whether the changed circumstances
took the legislature by surprise, or whether the proposed contractual
impairment was "budgetary legislation in the normal course." Such a high
standard is extremely difficult for states to meet. While the economic crisis
must be unforeseeable, a state's emergency response must be measured and
115 See Subway-Surface Supervisors Ass'n v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 375 N.E.2d 384, 390 (N.Y.
1978).
116 Buffalo Teachers Fed'n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 372 (2d Cir. 2006).
117 See Donohue v. Paterson, 715 F. Supp. 2d. 306, 325 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
118 Guy Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV.
L. REv. 1463, 1463 (1967).
119 See Struve, supra note 117, at 1463; see also United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S.
1, 31 (1977).
120 See Struve, supra note 117, at 1463; see also Douglas W. Kmiec &John 0. McGinnis, The
Contract Clause: A Return to the Original Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, n.135
(1987).
121 See US. Trust., 431 U.S. at 54 n.17 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing how the meaning of
reasonableness, which long signified the most relaxed regime of judicial review, is considered "new"
because it has now been fused with necessity, which has played a key role in the most demanding level
of constitutional review).
122 Id. at 60 (citing Knebel v. Hein, 429 U.S. 288, 297 (1977)).
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demonstrate a high level of consideration and tailoring to withstand
Contract Clause inquiry. This fails to appreciate the challenges states face
in economic crises. This standard also presupposes that, given the
opportunity, states would blindly repudiate their financial obligations
whenever it would be beneficial for them to do So.123
IV. THE PROPOSAL: AN APPROPRIATE MIDDLE GROUND THAT PRESERVES
STATES' POLICE POWERS
This Comment proposes a solution that bridges the gap between the
deferential framework of the first two centuries of Contract Clause
jurisprudence and the strict and confusing test arising out of U.S. Trust.
This solution preserves the first prong of US. Trust by asking whether the
contractual impairment is substantial, and then adds additional inquiries to
the second and third parts of the test. Under this new test, a state can
modify a public employee contract in a fiscal emergency, so long as the
impairment does not have retroactive, reckless, or excessive effects. This
approach strikes an appropriate balance between the costs of impairing
contracts with the costs of increased taxation and reductions in important
services.
A. Revising the Second Prong of the U.S. Trust inquiry: Establishing a
Diference Between "Compelling" and "Legitimate" Public Purposes
Rather than asking only whether a state can establish a legitimate public
purpose, this new test will also ask whether a state can demonstrate a
"compelling" public purpose. A state that can establish a compelling
public purpose will then be subjected to a lesser level of scrutiny, and a
court will uphold its legislation, provided that it is not "retroactive, reckless
or excessive." Legislation that addresses a public purpose that is merely
"legitimate," however, will be subjected to the "reasonable and necessary"
standard set forth by U.S. Trust.
Under this proposed solution, whether a public purpose is "compelling"
123 See id. at 61. Justice Brennan explains that the ability of states to enter into one-sided contracts
would provide little incentive for anyone to enter into a contract with a state. See id. A state's ability to
obtain credit, however, is dependent on its ability to use its lawmaking powers with restraint. As Justice
Brennan concluded in his dissenting opinion, few jurisdictions would "use their authority 'so foolish[ly]
as to kill a goose that lays golden eggs for them."' Id (quoting Erie R.R. v. Bd. Of Pub. Util. Comm'rs,
254, U.S. 394, 410 (1921)). Thus, a more deferential standard should be applied so that states can
respond to fiscal crises, as the financial welfare of public employees and similarly situated parties is
being policed by both the bond marketplace and by political processes. See also Evan C. Zoldan, The
Permanent Seat of Government: An Unintended Consequence of Heightened Scrutiny Under the
Contract Clause, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 163, 183-84 (2011).
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will depend on four factors: (1) whether the emergency that the legislation
addresses is "severe;" (2) whether the emergency is of an immediate
nature; (3) whether the emergency was foreseeable when the state entered
into the contract; and (4) whether reckless state government behavior
contributed to its fiscal emergency. Applying these criteria, the fiscal
emergency New York State faced in Donohue v. Paterson would constitute
a compelling public purpose. While it is difficult to precisely define
"severity," an $8.5 billion deficit that constitutes nearly 20 percent of a
state's operating budget would pass the test. Similarly, this emergency
would be considered "immediate" because New York State must have
funds available to function, which it would not if the emergency was not
addressed. 124 Finally, because the State's collective bargaining agreements
were negotiated before the Great Recession and were predicated on
optimistic forecasts as to the State's overall financial health,125 the State
would also have passed this test's foreseeability inquiry.
The fourth factor is premised on the notion that a state should not be able
to impair its contracts if it has acted recklessly in creating the financial
emergency. While what constitutes recklessness is difficult to quantify,
current New York Governor Andrew Cuomo's attempt to repeal the
millionaire's tax126 would affect the State's ability to impair its union
contracts. Similarly, under this proposed test, Wisconsin Governor Scott
Walker's ability to take away the collective bargaining rights of its union
employees would have been compromised by his corporate tax cut bill.127
Because New York's millionaire's tax remained in effect at the time of
Governor Paterson's proposed extender bills, the State would have passed
this inquiry.
124 See Defendants' Memorandum of Law, supra note 18, at 11-12. (Discussing how the State was
in danger of running out of money.).
125 See id. at 8.
126 See Frederic Dicker & Carl Campanile, Let Millionaire Tax Die Out, Cuomo Says, N.Y. POST,
Jan. 4, 2001,
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/national/let millionaire taxdieout cuomoVEe6iLvafTp2hL2ZG91F
LP; see also Thomas Kaplan, Who Benefits from the Tax Package, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2011, at A35.
127 See Scott Bauer, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker Signs Tax Cut Bill into Law, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Feb. 1, 2011, http://www.postcrescent.com/article/20110201/APCO101/10201042 1/Wisconsin-
Govemor-Scott-Walker-signs-tax-cut-bill-into-law; see also Ezra Klein, Unions Aren 't to Blame for
Wisconsin's Budget, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2011, http://voices.washingtonpost.comlezra-
klein/2011/02/unions arent to blame for wisc.html. Even if Walker had not passed this corporate tax
cut, his budget repair bill, stnpping unions of their collective bargaining rights, would be found
"reckless and excessive" under this proposed test.
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B. "Reckless and Excessive" vs. "Necessary and Reasonable"
Even if it can establish a compelling public purpose, a state must
demonstrate that its impairment is not "reckless or excessive." In this test,
a court will look at three factors to ensure that the impaired party receives
adequate protection: (1) whether the impairment is prospective, rather than
retroactive; (2) whether the government can achieve the purposes of the
contractual impairment equally effectively by more narrower measures;
and (3) whether the challenged legislation cuts "recklessly and excessively"
into the value of the creditors' financial interests. 128 While the state would
have the burden of showing that it could not achieve the purposes of the
challenged regulation equally effectively by one or more narrower
regulations, this standard of review would not allow a court to strike down
a contractual impairment by simply hypothesizing other means of
achieving the state's objectives that may either be implausible or overly
burdensome to taxpayers. Under this framework, New York State's
furloughs, wage freezes, and benefit freezes would have passed
constitutional muster. Even if the government would have achieved $250
million in savings from its public employee budget, it raised taxes by $4
billion, reduced Medicare services by $1.5 billion, and reduced school
funding by $1 billion to close its $8.5 billion shortfall. The State could not
have demonstrated a more moderate alternative with such drastic measures
already in place.
Finally, the cost saving measures of the emergency appropriations bills
would not be considered "reckless and excessive" under this proposed
framework. To determine whether the contractual impairment would be
considered reckless and excessive, courts would look to the length and the
severity of the contractual deprivation, as Justice Cardozo's did in W.B.
Worthen Company v. Kavanaugh.129 In Kavanaugh, the Supreme Court
struck down an impairment in which creditors were "without an effective
remedy" for at least six and one-half years, during which time the
government's obligation to pay principal or interest was suspended. 130
Here, because the unionized state workers' injuries were temporary in
nature and did not reach the level of the impairment described in
Kavanaugh, Governor Paterson's proposed emergency appropriation bills
128 In Donohue, New York's proposed furloughs and wage freezes would pass the first prong of
this test as they did not apply to work already performed, making the cuts prospective.
129 W.B Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 62 (1935). In this case, Arkansas enacted a
statute that diminished the remedies available to creditors under their bonds as a relief measure to




would pass constitutional scrutiny under this new test.
V. ADDRESSING ARGUMENTS AGAINST A MORE DEFERENTIAL
FRAMEWORK
Some commentators have argued that the potential for abuse of police
power would be greatly increased under a more deferential judicial
standard. 131 The argument is that, given the power to alter its own contract
unilaterally, a state would not act with any more restraint than an individual
wishing to escape an onerous contract. 132 However, this ignores states'
incentives to exercise self-restraint and discipline in order to maintain
credibility in the credit market and among voters.
Another argument against applying a more deferential standard to the
impairment of public contracts is that it would lead to higher costs to the
public in the long run. Commentators have argued that by allowing
legislatures to avoid their contractual obligations, public confidence in
these institutions would be shaken, leading to higher interest rates for
municipal borrowing or decreasing investment in municipal bonds.13 3 This
Comment addresses these concerns by proposing a solution that would
strike down contractual impairments that are retroactive, excessive, or
reckless in nature.
This proposed solution give states a way to respond to fiscal emergencies
while still leaving public sector employees with competitive salaries and
benefits. But can public employees afford to "take a haircut?"
131 See Bruce R. Genderson, The Constitutionality of the New York Municipal Wage Freeze and
Debt Moratorium: Resurrection of the Contract Clause, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 167, 189 (1976); see also
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817-18 (1879).
132 See Genderson, supra note 130, at 189-90; see also Lowe v. City of N.Y., 270 N.Y.S. 216, 221
(1934).
133 See Genderson, supra note 130, at 192; see also United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431
U.S. 1, 17-19 (1977).
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National Annual Wages by Occupation, 2009 -
State and Local Government vs. Private Sectorl 34
Occupation State & Local Private Sector Percent
Difference
Physicians $107,445 $188,147 -42.9%
Lawyers $82,164 $127,712 -35.7%
Computer $63,963 $73,543 -13.0%
Programmers
Accountants $53,860 $63,266 -13.6%
Janitors & $28,251 $24,421 17.0%
Cleaners
Security Guards $31,351 $23,927 31.0%
Maintenance $30,889 $22,911 34.8%
Workers
Mechanics $46,221 $42,588 8.6%
Police Officers $75,400 N/A N/A
Firefighters $69,620 N/A N/A
Teachers $63,111 N/A N/A
The data in this study suggests "that the mostly highly paid jobs in the
private sector, usually held by workers with high levels of education and
experience, are often not paid as well in the public sector."1 35 Conversely,
occupations that typically require lower levels of education or experience
are compensated comparatively well in the public sector. 136 While there are
no private sector equivalent jobs for policemen and firefighters, their
earnings approximate the average private sector worker with a college
degree. 137
It would be unreasonable to assert that public employees and their unions
are to blame for the states' fiscal crises, or that closing states' budget
shortfalls requires taking away the ability of unions to collectively bargain.
But given these economic times, taxpayers cannot afford to continue to
provide pensions and benefits for public workers that nearly no one in the
private sector enjoys. A Contract Clause standard that allows states to
134 Frank Braconi, Municipal Compensation in New York City, 5 (2011), available at
http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/press/pdfs/MunicipalCompNYC.pdf (comparing levels of
compensation between public sector and private sector workers).
135 See id.
136 See id.
137 See id. at 13.
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make reasonable contractual modifications in times of fiscal emergencies
will help prevent taxpayers from bearing all of the consequences of closing
budget shortfalls in the form of tax increases and reductions to essential
services.

